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Respecting Each Other and Taking 
Responsibility for Our Biases
E l i n o r   M a s o n
1 Introduction
One puzzling feature of a world like ours, one riven with various sorts of prej-
udice and oppression, is that oppressive behavior is not always malicious. An 
individual who has simply absorbed the attitudes of his social world might be 
entirely well meaning, honestly doing his best. The old- fashioned sexist, who 
takes his own behavior to be appropriate and chivalrous, has no idea that he is 
actually patronizing and belittling the women around him. From his point of 
view, he is acting entirely appropriately, and furthermore, he is justified in that 
view, given the world in which he has been raised. In that case, there is a puzzle 
about how and why such a person might be blameworthy.
The standard view about blameworthiness is that, in order to be blamewor-
thy, it is crucial that the agent has bad motives of some sort: what philosophers 
tend to call a bad will. But once we think about the nature of the agent’s envi-
ronment in cases like the old- fashioned sexist, it is not clear that we can locate 
the problematic aspects of the agent’s behavior in the agent’s will— rather, the 
problem comes from outside, from the nature of the society. It seems that such 
agents are nonculpably ignorant of the relevant moral truths. Thus the bad act 
does not reflect a poor quality of will. Yet, when people act in sexist and racist 
ways, through implicit bias, or more or less explicit bias, we are not inclined to 
take such agents to be beyond reproach. So the question I attempt to answer in 
this chapter is, in what way can we blame such agents? What is the basis, if any, 
for blaming them?
The answer I  give is that agents are sometimes blameworthy (where 
I  really mean that they are blameworthy, and not just that it is permissible to 
reproach them), even if they do not have any bad will. I argue that although the 
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paradigmatic account of blameworthiness is based on quality of will, we can and 
should be willing to allow that there are nonparadigmatic cases. I argue that the 
zone of responsibility can be extended to include acts that we are not fully in 
control of, and acts whose moral status we are nonculpably ignorant about at 
the time of acting. This extension of responsibility happens through a voluntary 
taking of responsibility. In what follows, I argue that there are certain conditions 
under which we should take responsibility, and that when we do so, we genu-
inely are responsible.
I start by arguing that it is indeed possible that some racist and sexist agents 
act without bad will, and so there is a category of problematic behavior that is 
not covered by traditional approaches to blameworthiness. I argue that Cheshire 
Calhoun’s suggestion (1989), that we should make a distinction between blame 
and moral reproach, does not go far enough in the cases that I am interested in. 
Intuitively, in these cases, we need something closer to full- blown blame, despite 
the admitted lack of bad will. Finally, I present my own suggestion, which is that 
we should think of a sphere of responsibility that is not based on bad will, but 
rather, is based on agents’ taking responsibility. I argue that we can understand 
the reasons for taking responsibility in terms of our relationships with others, 
whether those are personal relationships, or the relationships we have in virtue 
of a shared society.
2 Quality of Will
The central compatibilist idea, an idea we originally see in Hobbes and Hume, 
that gets refined by more recent philosophers such as Strawson (1962) and 
Frankfurt (1971), is that the crucial thing for moral responsibility is the qual-
ity of will behind the act.1 The phrase ‘quality of will’ (due to Strawson 1962) is 
now a term of art in this field, but I will very briefly explain what I mean by it. 
It would be a mistake to think that ‘will’ in ‘quality of will’ picks out something 
sui generis or mysterious. Rather, the word is being used to refer to an everyday 
notion: the motivations that lead to an action. So saying that what matters for 
moral responsibility is quality of will is just saying that what matters is how an 
agent was motivated.2
One major disagreement in the contemporary literature on compatibilism 
is over whether nonculpable ignorance is always an excuse. Volitionists argue 
that if an agent does not know what she is doing when she acts, she cannot be 
held responsible— she does not have the right sort of quality of will. According 
to volitionists, there is a control condition on responsibility, such that an agent 
must be in control of what she is doing, where that includes knowing what she 
is doing under the relevant description. For a hard- line volitionist, nonculpably 
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acquired ignorance is always an excuse. So an agent who does not know that 
the money she donates to charity is actually going straight into the pockets of 
oligarchs cannot be held responsible for that, and the agent who does not know 
that he is insulting someone by calling her ‘young lady’ cannot be held respon-
sible for that, and so on.3
By contrast, attributionists argue that quality of will can be good or bad with-
out self- conscious knowledge of what is being done.4 Attributionists argue that 
we can be blameworthy or praiseworthy as a result of our unconscious motiva-
tions. In Angela Smith’s example (2005), the agent forgets her friend’s birthday. 
She didn’t forget deliberately, and there is (let’s assume) nothing she deliberately 
did that caused her to forget. But her forgetting is caused by her bad will, by the 
fact that she does not care enough about her friend. An agent may tell herself 
that she is acting well, but in fact be driven by bad motivations. Words of “kind-
ness” are sometimes passive aggressive. Omissions and forgettings often indicate 
carelessness. A slip is sometimes Freudian. Thus, according to attributionists, we 
can say that the agent is blameworthy, even though she acted in ignorance.
My own view is that these are both ways of having a relevant quality of will, 
and although they give rise to slightly different sorts of blameworthiness, they 
are both important ways of being responsible.5 One way to have a bad will is to 
act badly knowing exactly what you are doing. Another way to have a bad will 
is to have bad motivations that one is not aware of. Having bad motivations is 
a way of having a bad will, even when there is no history of self- aware, culpable 
acts that led to these bad motivations. Of course, it may not be easy to determine 
what is going on in a particular case. Even in one’s own case it is not always easy 
to tell how deep motivations are working, and what knowledge one has at a sub-
conscious level. But there is nonetheless a fairly clear foundation for blamewor-
thiness here: blameworthiness depends on bad will, understood in one of these 
two ways.6
3 Bad Actions without Bad Will
In this section, I discuss three categories of bad action that (arguably) do not 
emanate from a bad will. In all three cases, the standard view is that we are not 
blameworthy for these actions. But we rightly, I  argue, feel some unease with 
the standard view. Blameworthiness in these cases may be complex, but it is not 
obvious that there is no blameworthiness.
Some of the ways in which an agent can produce a bad outcome without a 
bad will are entirely innocent and uncontroversial— cases where the bad out-
come is entirely down to obscurity or glitches in the outside world, and has 
nothing to do with agency per se. For example, an agent whose car breaks down 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Dec 06 2017, NEWGEN
oso-9780190609610-Hutchison.indd   165 12/6/2017   6:28:20 PM
166 S o c i a l  D i m e n s i o n s  o f  M o r a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
   
in a completely unpredictable way is not blameworthy for consequently miss-
ing a meeting. An agent is not to blame for wasting a charitable donation when 
the money is, through hidden and obscure means, going astray. An agent whose 
well- meaning words of kindness hit a raw nerve and offend someone in a way 
that could not reasonably have been expected is not blameworthy for the offense.
But there are also cases where although it is plausible that an agent does not 
have a bad will, it is not completely clear that the agent is off the hook. These are 
the cases that I focus on here.
3.1 Implicit Bias
One such case is the phenomenon of implicit or unconscious bias. I  want to 
remain neutral on what sort of attitude or attitudes implicit bias is composed of.7 
All I want to commit to is that implicit biases are revealed in our behavior (our 
hiring behavior, for example) and that we are not aware of having these biases.
There is broad agreement, both in the volitionist camp and in the attribution-
ist camp, that we can be indirectly responsible for our biases in a fairly straightfor-
ward way.8 If we are aware that we have biases, or are likely to, and if we know that 
there are things we can do to avoid having or manifesting biases, then obviously 
we should do those things, and if we do not, we are blameworthy. This is just 
analogous to indirect responsibility for our car malfunctioning. If we know that 
the brakes need to be checked, and we don’t check them, we are blameworthy 
for the accident that is caused by the brakes failing.
However, there is disagreement over whether we can be directly responsible 
for our biases, or for the actions caused by our biases, and this is a hard question 
even for attributionists. Our biases are usually the result of absorbing problem-
atic ideas from our culture. Thus they are importantly different from character 
traits, though they may appear to work in the same way. An innately misanthropic 
person is like that by nature, and so although we do not blame him for acquiring 
the trait (after all, he did not acquire it deliberately or though carelessness), we 
do blame him for the behavior that manifests the trait. We also judge the person 
for being misanthropic— for having (though not for acquiring) the trait.9
An implicit bias is not usually acquired deliberately or through carelessness, 
and so the agent is not usually blameworthy for acquiring the bias.10 However, 
the mere fact that a bias is caused by external forces does not mean that it does 
not implicate the agent’s will. We must be careful not to confuse the origin of a 
trait with its nature. A misanthrope may be misanthropic because of a virus con-
tracted in infancy, but that does not make a difference to how misanthropic he 
is. His quality of will is not affected by the fact of a certain history (and though 
of course different histories tend to produce different qualities of will, they may 
not). If we consistently stick to the claim that it is just the quality of will itself 
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that merits blame, then the origin of the trait cannot deliver an excuse.11 The 
question, then, is not just where the trait comes from, but to what extent is the 
agent’s will engaged in the exercise of the trait?
There is good reason to think that implicit biases often implicate the agent’s 
will. People who test positive for implicit racist biases also tend to exhibit avoid-
ance behavior, suggesting that there is something visceral going on, something 
that it would be hard to characterize without referring to the agent’s deep moti-
vations.12 Compare a tendency to underestimate certain sorts of probability— 
the likelihood that two people in a room have the same birthday, for example. 
This tendency, which many of us have, is probably innate, but it does not seem 
to implicate our will in any interesting way. We do not make the error out of any 
suspect motivation. We just make it because our brains are pretty bad at dealing 
with probabilities. Implicit bias of the sort I am discussing here, by contrast, is 
very much involved in the moral texture of the world. It is very plausible that our 
deep motivations make us susceptible to implicit biases, that we are predisposed 
to accept hierarchies that favor us or that resonate with other morally suspect 
motivations.
So the attributionist account gets a foothold here. Our biases are very likely to 
go hand in hand with problematic motivations such as contempt, disgust, and so 
on. Thus there is a way to defend the view that implicit bias is, in itself, directly 
blameworthy: it may be a way of having a bad will. I think it is likely that many 
cases of implicit bias are like this.
However, there may be biases that do not involve bad will. Returning to the 
point that implicit biases seem to come from outside us, there is another way 
to understand this so that it makes more sense as a potential excuse. It might 
be that the operation of biases bypasses our will. We might just absorb informa-
tion about stereotypes and reproduce it in our behavior without any attitude 
being involved at all. On this picture, we are, as animals, as machines, partly auto-
mated. I have no idea if that is correct, but it seems at least passingly plausible.13 
If our biases operate by bypassing our wills, then it cannot be said that we have a 
bad will in exhibiting bias.
In that case, neither volitionism nor attributionism could make sense of direct 
responsibility for biases. We would be left with a picture whereby, so long as we 
have taken all the measures that we reasonably could to avoid bias and its results, 
we would not be responsible for remaining biased. In the actual world, where we 
do not have good techniques for avoiding or ameliorating bias, that would leave 
a lot of bias and manifestation of bias blameless.
Perhaps this conclusion is acceptable, though it strikes me as unsatisfactory. 
Agency is complex. There isn’t a clear dividing line between what we do through 
our will in the sense relevant for blameworthiness, and what just happens. Even 
if implicit biases are automated and do not engage my motivations, and so do 
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not reflect bad will, they nonetheless seem to issue from my agency. They do 
not seem to be in the category of mere events— if I unknowingly discriminate 
against the women on the shortlist, this is something I have done. It seems too 
quick to say that I am not responsible in any way. So we have a puzzle here— on 
the one hand, it might be that implicit bias does not involve bad will. On the 
other hand, there is a strong pull to find it blameworthy.
3.2 Explicit Bias
Explicit bias may not involve awareness of wrongdoing, but it also probably 
involves bad will most of the time, and so the attributionist sort of blamewor-
thiness is applicable.14 Both racism and homophobia seem intimately related to 
obviously problematic attitudes, like disgust and contempt. Racist and homo-
phobic attitudes may be couched in terms of factual claims (about intelligence, 
or God’s will, or whatever), but it does not seem likely that these factual mistakes 
are mere factual mistakes. It is fairly obvious that these mistakes are motivated 
by hostile attitudes.
Sexist attitudes, like racist and homophobic ones, also usually seem to depend 
on false factual beliefs. But it is very often plausible that sexist attitudes are not 
hostile and that they are not underlaid with contempt or disgust. Consider this 
example from Cheshire Calhoun:
Imagine, for example, a man who always refers to women as “girls” or 
“ladies.” He, too, is uncoerced into doing so and is in complete pos-
session of normal adult reasoning faculties. Yet it seems he ought not 
to be blamed for linguistically infantilizing or patronizing women, for, 
from his point of view, one cannot reasonably expect him to see any-
thing wrong with his actions. We may suppose that in his childhood, 
his father and mother referred to women as “girls” or “ladies.” He may 
also have come to understand that the former is flattering because it 
suggests youth and the latter simply polite. We may suppose that the 
people to whom he was exposed when he was growing up gave him 
examples only of this linguistic use and this understanding of its sig-
nificance. From his point of view, it is natural to conclude that “girl” is 
flattering rather than infantilizing and that “lady” is polite rather than 
patronizing. (Calhoun 1989, 398)
In this example, arguably, the man has no bad will at all. He is ignorant, for sure, 
but he is ignorant in an understandable way— he is not culpably ignorant. Nor 
is he exhibiting bad will in the attributionist sense. All his motivations toward 
women are benign. They are patronizing, and he would probably assent to 
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various claims that are patently false, such as that women are less good drivers 
than men. But from his point of view, his attitudes are apt, just as we believe (I 
hope correctly) that patting a dog, calling it a “good doggy,” and praising it for 
sitting on command, are apt rather than patronizing. We can make a distinction 
between sexism and misogyny: not all sexism involves misogyny.15
There is an important point worth emphasizing here, and that is that the 
more historically isolated the case, the more likely we are to think that it is 
possible for the agent to be sexist without a bad will. Miranda Fricker (2007) 
considers an example of sexism that involves no bad will (though she does 
not frame it quite in those terms). In Fricker’s example, taken from Patricia 
Highsmith’s novel, The Talented Mr Ripley, the character of Herbert Greenleaf 
repeatedly discounts the views of Marge, the young woman who would have 
become his daughter- in- law had his son not been murdered. Marge is actually 
correct about the identity of the murderer, but Greenleaf repeatedly ignores her 
insights. From his point of view, Marge is not worth taking seriously (Fricker 
2007, 14– 15).16
Fricker’s main argument is that one of the ways that a social hierarchy affects 
us is by affecting the credibility levels we accord to others.17 As Fricker points 
out, and as others have argued before her, we do not give as much weight to the 
testimony of people who are lower down in the social hierarchy.18 So the ques-
tion arises, are people blameworthy for committing this testimonial injustice? 
Fricker argues that the agent is not blameworthy (100– 101).19
Fricker’s background thought is that Greenleaf ’s ignorance is non- culpable. 
His attitude toward Marge is not hostile or contemptuous on a personal level. 
He believes, and is justified in believing, that her perspective is inferior. We can 
imagine for the sake of argument (especially as he is fictional) that he has made 
no epistemic slips, there is nothing he missed, nothing going on that he is not in 
control of. The problem is in the world, not in him. Let’s also stipulate that there 
is no bad will. It seems plausible that agents in solidly sexist eras are in the grip of 
cultural norms that are so powerful that the agent can accept them without any 
extra push from suspect motivations.
Things look different when the relevant evidence is readily available. Most of 
us now have evidence that we are all prone to biases, and that there is systematic 
discrimination against women and people of color, and so on. When the evi-
dence is “available,” it becomes less likely that someone who gets things wrong 
has no bad will. However, there are various reasons why available evidence 
might not be availed of. One reason is bad will. But there are other reasons: the 
agent might be isolated from the evidence by peculiar circumstances or by non-
sinister character traits. In what follows, I will be working on the assumption that 
it is possible that even in our era, people can be in the grip of sexist conceptual 
frameworks that, though sexist, do not reflect a bad will.
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I agree with Fricker that when the evidence is not available, there is some 
undermining of blameworthiness for false moral views.20 Of course, the issue of 
evidence may not be necessary to establish blameworthiness: it may be that the 
attitude itself involves a bad will, and as I pointed out earlier, the attributionist 
account is sufficient to establish blameworthiness. But let’s assume that it is pos-
sible to have sexist (or otherwise problematic) attitudes without having a bad 
will. My hunch is that in both the historical and present- day cases, we think that 
the agent is blameworthy in some way for those attitudes, even when the agent 
does not have a bad will. My aim in this chapter is to vindicate that thought. 
I also explain why an agent in the historical case is less blameworthy than the 
agent in the present day, given that (by hypothesis) neither has a bad will.
3.3 Glitches
I want to briefly mention one more area where there are bad acts without bad 
will. This category of acts is not connected with our prejudices, but with the 
flawed nature of our agency. Sometimes, we just forget things, or don’t notice 
them, in ways that do not reflect a bad will. Randolph Clarke (2014) imagines 
a man who has promised his spouse that he will get milk on the way home. 
Imagine that there is nothing that he has failed to do that he should have done in 
order to remember. He could have set reminders, but it would have been “bord-
erline compulsive” behavior to do so. He could have stopped himself from think-
ing about his work on the way home, but he often thinks about his work, and 
with no bad effects (2014, 165).21 In other words, we are to imagine a case where 
an agent forgets something and there is no bad will. Forgetting the milk is not 
very important, but we sometimes forget things that are much more important, 
and again, it seems possible that there is no bad will in these cases. From now on 
I will call these unmotivated forgettings “glitches.”
Many philosophers have argued that in this sort of case, if there really is no bad 
will, then the agent is not responsible.22 Clarke disagrees; he says that the agent is 
responsible, and responsible just because he has fallen below a standard (2014, 
167). The problem with that response is that it is not clear what ‘falling below a 
standard’ means. If it means that the agent did it knowingly, or with unconscious 
bad will, then we are back to the standard accounts of what renders an agent blame-
worthy: some sort of bad will. If, on the other hand, the agent fell below a standard 
without realizing it, without intending it, or without being poorly motivated with 
respect to that standard, then we have no reason to think the agent is blameworthy. 
There are many ways of falling below a standard that have no implications at all for 
blameworthiness— I might simply be too short to go on the rollercoaster.
In all of the cases I have mentioned (some implicit biases, some explicit biases, 
and glitches), we are pulled in two directions. On the one hand, the absence of a 
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bad will seems to indicate an excuse, as it usually does. In these cases, the will is 
not engaged in the action in the right way for the standard accounts of responsi-
bility to get a hold. In some (but not all) cases of implicit bias (at least possibly), 
the will is bypassed by some heuristic the brain has. In some cases of explicit bias 
(again, the claim is not that all cases are like this, just that it is a possibility), so 
long as the beliefs are not inherently contemptuous, it is possible to accept them 
“innocently.” In the case of glitches, obviously, there is just a glitch— sometimes 
we just slip for no reason.
On the other hand, it is not obvious that the agent is off the hook. Think 
about how we would feel on realizing that we have acted badly in one of these 
ways. Imagine being presented with evidence that our selection of job candi-
dates was racially biased. Or imagine being presented with video evidence that 
we did not listen to a suggestion or argument from a female colleague, and yet 
when the same point was presented by a man we took it seriously. And of course, 
the experience of realizing that we have forgotten something important is famil-
iar. In all those cases, I think, we are likely to feel something akin to guilt.
Introspection is not a completely reliable test here. First, we sometimes take 
on more or less guilt than we should— I return to that point in section 6. Second, 
what we should immediately do when presented with the evidence as in the 
above cases, and what most of us would immediately do, is examine our own con-
science for bad will. Did I in fact forget your birthday because I don’t care about 
you? Do I subconsciously undervalue people of color, or women? We might feel 
guilty because we assume that we do harbor bad will, even when we cannot find 
it, and it is probably a good thing that we are inclined to self- examination in 
these cases, and inclined to find ourselves guilty until proven innocent. But this 
is not the sort of guilt (or blameworthiness) that I seek to vindicate here.
So let’s stipulate that in these cases there is no bad will. Let’s imagine, further, 
that we are presented with the explanation for our behavior. Imagine that the 
mechanisms of the brain, the way it absorbs and encodes information, the way it 
glitches, and so on, are all explained to us. Should we now feel that we can safely 
distance ourselves from our actions, that our actions are not our fault, but rather 
are things that happen to us, just as if we were blown by the wind? I think not. 
I think it would be apt to feel responsible in these cases, and I will defend that 
view in the rest of the chapter.
4 Reproach
Let’s return to Calhoun’s discussion of the well- meaning man, whose basic 
framework for understanding the world is sexist. Calhoun herself does not put 
the issue in terms of whether the man has a bad quality of will.23 She tacitly takes 
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for granted that the man does not have a bad will, and that therefore he is not 
blameworthy. Calhoun’s concern is whether we should nonetheless blame him. 
Calhoun’s answer is that we cannot let him off the hook, because that amounts 
to condoning his behavior, and it impedes moral progress. Calhoun argues that 
although this man is not strictly blameworthy, we should reproach him.
I am entirely in agreement with Calhoun’s argument for reproach in this case, 
but as Calhoun herself says, that is not the same as saying that he is blameworthy. 
It is worth stressing this distinction. Our reasons for reproaching, that is to say, 
the act of reproaching, can differ from what we think of as the paradigm reasons 
for holding responsible without becoming the wrong sorts of reasons. The par-
adigm reason for holding someone responsible is that they are responsible. On 
the compatibilist account, that means that they have a relevant quality of will. 
But there can be other valid reasons for reproaching people.24 For example, we 
may reproach children for things we don’t actually take them to be responsible 
for in order to teach them how to be responsible. The sense in which Calhoun 
suggests we should hold the benignly motivated sexist responsible is not quite 
like that, because the context is very different, as she points out (1989, 401). 
But the justifying reasons for holding responsible are similar, in that they are 
forward- looking; they relate to the way we would like things to be, as opposed to 
being an assessment of what an agent has done in the past.25
My focus here is not on holding responsible; it is on being responsible, and on 
blameworthiness. In the next section, I argue that there is a way to make sense of 
blameworthiness proper in cases like the old- fashioned sexist.
5 Taking Responsibility
Before I present my argument for taking responsibility for biases, I need to make 
clear that I  am talking about responsibility in the sense of blameworthiness, 
and not about liability. Liability, legal or conventional, is just the duty to make 
amends in the event that a bad outcome occurs. Strict liability (as it is called in 
law) does not imply that the agent who is liable must have a bad will, or even that 
she herself performs the relevant act: one can be liable for what one’s tenant, or 
children do, and for what the wind does, or what just happens. Liability does not 
imply blameworthiness.
I am not talking about liability here. It may well be that we should take on 
liability in some of the cases I am interested in, but I am suggesting something 
more ambitious. I am suggesting that we should take on responsibility for these 
actions. We should own them: we should feel about them as we feel about the 
actions that we do deliberately, or out of good or bad will that we were not aware 
of at the time. We should be willing to extend the realm of our own responsibility. 
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Or, to put it another way, we should be willing to limit the excuses that we take 
ourselves to be entitled to appeal to. In general, we can appeal to various sorts 
of luck, accident, inadvertence, and ignorance as an excuse, but the kind of inad-
vertence that is in play here will not count as an excuse.
I shall motivate my claim that we should sometimes take responsibility by 
using an example.26 Imagine a conversation between Angela and her friend, after 
Angela has forgotten an important birthday. Imagine that Angela searches her own 
conscience and finds no flaw in her will at all. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, 
that she is accurate in her introspection. It is not the case that she failed to care 
enough. Rather, her forgetting her friend’s birthday was just a glitch. Imagine that 
she now says to her friend, “Hey, you have nothing to worry about, it’s not a big 
deal, I just forgot.” There is something lacking in this response. The friend might 
justifiably feel that an apology is owed even if there was no bad will: she might feel, 
and with good reason, it seems, that the lack of bad will is not entirely exonerating.
We can imagine further, that Angela accepts that she should apologize. She 
accepts liability (though we do not usually talk about liability in contexts where 
restitution consists only, or mainly, of an apology). Her friend might still feel 
something is amiss. The friend might ask whether Angela feels bad, and meet 
this response: “No, I don’t feel bad. As I said, it was a glitch. I have nothing to 
feel bad about. I have apologized. What more do you want?” There is a natural 
thought that her friend might reasonably reply, “I want you to feel bad about it! 
I want you to feel guilty— to take responsibility. This is not about you. It’s about 
me. I hoped for a card from you on my birthday, and you just forgot!”
There are, of course, complexities in this story. One possible line of objection 
points to the fact that in most cases where we fail in a duty, even if it is com-
pletely clearly not blameworthy, it would be cold- hearted not to feel anything in 
response to the failure, but the appropriate feelings are not necessarily guilt and 
remorse; they are more like regret, sympathy, and empathy. The problem with 
Angela in this story, we might say, is just that she seems so cold- hearted.
It is true that when we fail in a duty, even when it is not through bad will, it is 
usually fitting to feel sympathy and empathy and so on, and it is true of course 
that we don’t tend to like people who shrug off those feelings as unimportant. 
But there is more than that going on with Angela. Angela insists that she does 
not feel bad. She takes a very strict approach to her own responsibility— she 
knows that she had no bad will, and for her, that is the end of the story. But her 
friend wants more; their relationship demands more.
You might think that the friend is just wrong about things, and that Angela’s 
clear- sighted assessment of the situation is preferable. But I am not arguing about 
what the reasons or evidence supports. I am talking about what we want from our 
loved ones, and the attitudes that we take as evidence that they are committed 
to us in the right sort of way. The idea here is that it is not always appropriate to 
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insist on the paradigmatic criteria for blameworthiness. As an analogy: the par-
adigmatic criteria for love might preclude loving our dogs. But the clear truth is 
that we do love our dogs. So we must adjust our conception of what love is.
In the example above, I  focused on a personal relationship and the way in 
which personal relationships can have internal demands that do not align with 
philosophical conceptions of blameworthiness. Next, let’s turn to failures to do 
one’s duty to other people, where the duty is not a duty arising from a personal 
relationship, but just a duty we have to our fellow people. Start with implicit 
bias. Imagine that we discover that we are one of the subjects in the well- known 
hiring bias experiment, in which CVs associated with female names, or tradi-
tionally black names, are judged as less worthy than identical CVs that appear 
to belong to white men (Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke 1999; Bertrand and 
Mullainthan 2004). Imagine that you are confronted with the evidence that you 
have done this. In many cases, this may involve bad will, of familiar or more com-
plex kinds.27 But let’s stipulate again, that in the cases I am discussing, there was 
no bad will. The act is like a glitch, in that it just happens, though of course the 
causal mechanism is slightly different in a glitch.
Again, there are complexities here. Of course you should accept liability: you 
should be willing to do your best to rectify the situation. And you should feel 
emotions like regret and sympathy. But, I  argue, as a member of a society in 
which there are women and people of color, and a history of oppression, you 
should be willing to take on extended responsibility for this sort of failing. You 
should feel, not just regret, but something akin to guilt or remorse. Taking on 
that responsibility is constitutive of respecting your fellow community members 
in the appropriate way. Taking on responsibility reflects the gravity and nature 
of the offense. In treating someone as less valuable because of race or sex, we 
are undermining their personhood. We go some way to restoring it by taking on 
extended responsibility for our error.
Again, I will try to motivate the claim by using an example. Take an exam-
ple of explicit bias:  imagine that we explain to Calhoun’s character (call him 
Stan) that “young lady” is patronizing, and that he should not think of men and 
women as having different roles and properties. Let’s assume, as before, that Stan 
had no bad will, and that he approaches the issue with a willingness to believe 
that he has made a mistake. He tries hard to understand that age is irrelevant, and 
that gender neutrality is best, but that if there is no gender- neutral way to address 
someone, “woman” is better than “lady.” Imagine two attitudes he might take to 
his own future errors:
Stan Doing His Best:
This is all very complex. I’m not sure that I  am going to get it right. 
If I  get it wrong, though, it’s just an innocent mistake. Don’t blame 
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me. I really am trying. I am doing my best. You can’t ask more of me 
than that.
Stan Responsible:
This is all very complex. I’m not sure that I am going to get it right. I will 
feel terrible if I get it wrong in future, now that I understand more about 
all this, and I apologize in advance. But of course I am absolutely going 
to try my best.
Let me stipulate that each really is willing to try their best, that each believes 
that ‘young lady’ is patronizing. Nonetheless, Stan Responsible has taken the 
seriousness of the issue to heart, in a way that Stan Doing His Best has not. The 
fact that he will feel terrible shows that he is thinking about the women he will 
encounter in the future, and the way that his attitude to them will affect them. 
He is thinking of himself as having a relationship with other members of the 
community, a relationship that requires respect. So even though he knows that 
he may accidentally get something wrong in the future, and he knows that doing 
so would not betray a bad will on his part, he takes responsibility— he does not 
allow himself to appeal to inadvertence as an excuse.
By contrast, Stan Doing His Best seems more concerned with himself. He 
seems to have examined his conscience, found it clear, and takes it that doing his 
best is enough. What more can he do? He can’t do more, of course, and my argu-
ment is not that he should do more than his best— he should do his best. But he 
should also eschew the excuse that further slips would be entirely inadvertent. 
He should take on responsibility.
Think about the way in which we are all Stan. We are, most of us, in a situation 
where we know that we are likely to be in the grip of various problematic views 
and assumptions, ways of framing the world and social relations that we have 
inherited and have not yet had our consciousness raised about. What should we 
be more concerned with: our own consciences, or the people to whom we are 
being unfair in our ignorance? The issue of whether or not we have a bad will is 
not the important issue. The important issue is that we take seriously that we 
are wronging someone. Taking it seriously involves taking responsibility for it, 
feeling bad about it.
And think about how we feel as the injured party. What do we want from our 
fellow members of society? We want them to do their best to avoid being biased 
against us, obviously. And I am not denying that that is the main thing we want. 
But that doesn’t mean that we don’t also want them to take seriously the wrongs 
they do us. Imagine a conversation between a woman and her male head of depart-
ment, where he apologizes for having failed to promote her a few years ago. He 
explains that he now sees that although he did not have any bad will at all, he was 
unfortunately biased in various ways, and that he will now rectify the situation. 
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Again, he may or may not take on responsibility as well as liability. Understanding 
that he has actually taken responsibility, that he feels remorse, makes a huge differ-
ence to this exchange and to how things are in the future. Liability is not enough. 
Being a decent fellow member of a department, being a decent fellow member of 
a society, requires taking on responsibility for inadvertent injustices. So, when we 
inadvertently fail in our duties to others, where those duties are duties of relation-
ships, personal or impersonal, we should take on responsibility.
The ‘should’ here is normative, but it does not indicate a moral duty. This is 
usefully illustrated by contrasting my argument with an argument presented by 
David Enoch. Enoch (2012) argues that we sometimes have a moral duty to 
take responsibility in areas where agency is ‘penumbral’. Enoch’s account of the 
range of actions for which we might take on responsibility is much wider than 
mine:  Enoch talks about responsibility for what one’s child does, for an acci-
dent that kills a pedestrian, and for what one’s country does.28 Thus our concerns 
are slightly different. I am concerned with actions that are genuinely an agent’s 
actions. This illustrates an important problem in Enoch’s account. The area of 
“penumbral agency” is not really an area of agency at all. It is an area in which we 
might reasonably be held liable, but it would be stretching things to say that we 
might be genuinely responsible, or blameworthy in my sense. Enoch conflates 
taking on responsibility with taking on liability.
The difference between taking on liability and taking on responsibility is a 
difference in the psychology of the agent— the attitudes and feelings that they 
are taking on. When we feel responsible for an action, we must feel that it is our 
action, that we did it, that we own it. Feelings of remorse and so on are apt when 
the agent herself acts badly, but are not apt in regard to the actions of others. 
Thus we cannot take on responsibility for the actions of others. We can take on 
liability. Taking on liability is just willingness to perform acts of recompense in 
the event of a bad outcome. It does not involve ownership, or the attendant feel-
ings of remorse and so on.
It might be objected that what one should feel when one has inadvertently 
acted badly is not remorse, but something more like what Bernard Williams calls 
“agent regret” (1981, 27; 1993, 69). Indeed, Miranda Fricker, in a recent arti-
cle, makes exactly this claim (2016). Fricker imagines someone who, through 
no epistemic fault, is in the grip of sexist prejudices. Such a person might be 
innocent in having acquired such bad views (they have come from the epistemic 
environment), and also justified in thinking that she is free of such prejudices. 
Fricker compares that person to Oedipus, as discussed by Williams (1993). 
Fricker says, “Both do voluntary things the significance of which, through no 
fault of their own, they do not grasp; and in both cases their failure to grasp it is 
down to their circumstances or environment. They both suffer a kind of environ-
mental bad luck” (2016, 45).
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The notion of agent regret is much weaker than the notion of remorse. It is 
also much broader. Williams (1981, 1993) uses various examples to justify his 
idea that agent regret is an overlooked moral emotion. One example depends 
on outcome luck: he compares two lorry drivers who drive with the same level 
of care: one kills a child, and one does not. The example of Oedipus seems a bit 
different, as Fricker points out. Oedipus acts deliberately, but he doesn’t know 
what he is doing; he is unaware of some important facts. And what would we say 
about Helen of Troy— should she feel agent regret? Did she launch a thousand 
ships? Of course not, but at the same time, we might think it odd if Helen feels 
absolutely nothing about the fact that the Trojan War started because of her face. 
To be fair to Helen, her face did nothing— it was perceived in certain ways by 
certain people, and they started the Trojan War, but still, it was Helen’s face, and 
even if her actions were beyond reproach, it would be odd of her to feel nothing 
at all. So we might be drawn to the view that there are shades of agent regret, 
varying in both quantity and quality.
This leads to the very natural thought that remorse as well as agent regret 
comes in various shades. Remorse is paradigmatically appropriate when one 
has knowingly and deliberately done something bad, when one is blameworthy 
on the volitionist account, in other words. As I said earlier, attributionists argue 
that one can be blameworthy without self- awareness. One way to understand 
the debate between volitionists and attributionists is as a dispute over what a 
univocal notion of blameworthiness applies to. But as Gary Watson (1996, 
2004)  influentially pointed out, we could think in terms of different sorts of 
responsibility.29 I think that one is blameworthy in a slightly different way when 
one acts without awareness, but it is still genuine blameworthiness, and the 
agent should feel a very close relative of remorse. It would be a shame to conflate 
the distinction between these two ways of being blameworthy, but that does not 
downgrade either of them.30
So, returning to the distinction between taking on liability and taking on 
responsibility, the above reflections on shades of remorse do not undermine 
the distinction, even if they make us think that the boundaries might be vague. 
Taking on responsibility is more personal, more emotional, and more weighty 
than taking on liability. There is also an important difference in the sorts of rea-
son one might have for taking on liability or responsibility. I have argued that 
the reason for taking on responsibility in certain cases is that it is constitutive 
of respectful relationships. There are some contexts in which, when we inad-
vertently let someone down, we have to own that. We have to take it on, give it 
the same status as the acts that issue from our will. We do not, however, have a 
moral duty to take on responsibility. We could eschew the whole relationship. 
The point is rather that if we are committed to the relationship, whether personal 
or social, we must act in certain ways.
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Enoch (2012), by contrast, is interested in diagnosing a moral fault. He argues 
that the fault in the lorry driver who does not take on anything after (nonnegli-
gently) having killed a pedestrian is that he has violated his moral duty to take 
responsibility (2012, 110– 111). But although the lorry driver has a moral duty 
to take on liability— at the very least to apologize, and to make amends in other 
small ways if possible— he has no duty to take on responsibility or blameworthi-
ness. Nothing hangs on him taking on more than liability— it is not required by 
the relationship in play.
Enoch thinks that taking on responsibility is an act of will, and that justifies 
his view that it is something we sometimes have a duty to do it. I agree if we 
understand him as talking about liability: in nonlegal contexts, taking on liabil-
ity can be an act of will. But taking on responsibility is more like a disposition. 
Some people are inclined to take on responsibility; they do not actively do it 
so much as discover that they have done it. Ideally, their taking on responsibil-
ity is responsive to their relationships in an appropriate way. To respect your 
partner is (assuming that this is what your partner wants) to automatically feel 
bad about having let him down, even when you let him down inadvertently. To 
respect your fellow people is to feel bad when you wrong them.31 Of course, our 
dispositions to take on responsibility are not always perfectly responsive to the 
genuine and legitimate needs of our relationships. They can be distorted in vari-
ous ways. I return to that point below.
First, I want to briefly return to historical cases. I have argued that we should 
take responsibility for the ways in which we inadvertently let people down. But 
that doesn’t clearly apply to people who never realize that they have let peo-
ple down. Fricker’s Greenleaf is just a man of his time, and he is trapped in his 
time. It seems that it does not make sense to say of Greenleaf that he should take 
responsibility for his mistakes, because he is not even remotely aware of the pos-
sibility that he is making that sort of mistake.
I agree that it does not make sense for Greenleaf to take responsibility. Ideally 
he would come to see things differently, of course, but if we imagine him in 
the historical context he is in, he does not have enough distance from his own 
oppressive actions and tendencies to take responsibility for them. Thus, my view 
makes sense of our ambivalence about historical cases. First, we can understand 
why it might be that the agent has no bad will— the epistemic circumstances 
are bad. And second, whereas we expect, both normatively and predictively, 
our peers to take responsibility for their inadvertent oppressive actions or ten-
dencies, we know that someone who is historically isolated will not have done 
so, and will have had very limited opportunity to do so. As Fricker remarks, it 
would take someone really exceptional to see through the orthodoxy of the 
day (2007, 101). This is not to say that we have no critical resources. We still 
think, of course, that the agent should not have been so biased, that he has done 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Dec 06 2017, NEWGEN
oso-9780190609610-Hutchison.indd   178 12/6/2017   6:28:20 PM
 Tak ing  R e spon s ib i l i t y  f or  Our   B ia s e s  179
   
something wrong in being so biased, and so on, and that the world itself is prob-
lematic and needs to be changed.
There is one last point to make, and that is that when an agent takes on respon-
sibility, she is responsible. One might think that taking on responsibility is arti-
ficial in some way, or, like taking on liability, it does not really involve the deep 
sense of responsibility. But my argument is that one can change one’s standing 
with regard to an inadvertent action, and if one takes on responsibility for it, one 
really is responsible. This is not a radical claim: it is just a development of what 
the compatibilist needs for the compatibilist view to get going. Compatibilism 
requires a certain amount of good faith. It is always possible to turn around and 
suddenly see things in the light of determinism. If we do that, we can stop seeing 
ourselves as responsible at all. So the argument I am making here is just a devel-
opment of that point; it builds on what compatibilism must already rely on: that 
we are willing to see ourselves as responsible.
6 Feminist Implications
I shall close with some feminist implications of this proposal.32 It is a “well- 
known fact,” in the sense that is likely to be taken for granted in popular cultural 
forms such as magazine articles and sitcoms, that women feel more guilt than 
men do.33 We feel guilty about our children, our spouses, our pets, about what 
we eat, about how we speak, about how we look, about what we say, about how 
hard we work, about how messy our houses are, and, even more disturbingly, it 
seems that we feel guilt if we are assaulted or raped or harassed. It is always our 
fault. Men, by contrast, at least in the popular imagination, breeze through life, 
feeling guilty only about what they can control.
The alleged problem (it may be a figment of the popular imagination, but 
I will assume that the impression is accurate for the sake of argument) is not 
simply that women feel worse about what they have done. It is that women take 
on responsibility for more of what happens than men do. And that is not sim-
ply a matter of taking on more responsibilities (though it seems that women 
do that too, as the well- documented phenomenon of the “second shift” illus-
trates34). The point is that, as I have argued, we have some leeway over what we 
take responsibility for, and women seem to take on more.
The social context of this picture is, of course, a patriarchal society. Thus, as 
I suggested above, the ways in which we are inclined to take on extended respon-
sibility are themselves hostage to the social environment we are immersed in. 
If women really do feel more guilt then men, it is partly because women are 
blamed more, are held more responsible than men are. For example, efforts 
to prevent unwanted pregnancies, rape, and sexual harassment often focus on 
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educating girls. Girls are taught to think that it is up to them to learn how to 
say “no” effectively, how to insist on condom use, how to dress so as to avoid 
unwanted attention, and so on. So it is not surprising that failure to prevent bad 
things happening feels like a failure. Part of what is going on here is that women 
are unfairly being made to take responsibility, to feel guilty, about things that 
others do.
But my argument suggests another explanation for the (putative) fact that 
women feel more guilt than men. I have argued that we take on extended respon-
sibility because our relationships require it. As I pointed out earlier, our close 
personal relationships require what we think they require: we make our own rela-
tionship conditions. We make them partly on an individual basis, but we also 
make them culturally. In some cultures, arranged marriages seem fine; in others, 
they do not. What we can accept and what will make us happy depend very much 
on what we have been brought up to expect. And what we will accept depends on 
our bargaining position. The bargaining positions of those in oppressed groups 
are, of course, weaker than those of the privileged.
So it might seem that my view leaves little room for normative criticism of rela-
tionships that are shaped by oppressive social structures. If what people expect 
from women in a relationship is more responsibility than what they expect from 
men, that makes it true that the relationship requires more from women. And 
this is indeed the lived experience of many women in heterosexual relationships. 
In order for the relationship to work, to feel right, the woman has to take on an 
awful lot of extended responsibility.
The solutions are, of course, not out of reach. I find it interesting that once we 
understand responsibility as involving an element of taking responsibility, and 
once we see that that is connected to our social relationships, it is evident that 
the nature of our social relationships must be examined carefully. We cannot 
simply take for granted how we respond to others; rather, we should interrogate 
our responses. We cannot take for granted the shape of our relationships, but 
should examine them for ideological distortions. My view is not that we should 
take everything for granted and base responsibility on that. My view is rather 
that especially because responsibility is intertwined with our social world, it is 
important that we are critical of our social world.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that there is an interesting category of acts that do not betray bad 
will, but that are nonetheless not clearly ones that we should let people off the 
hook for. Such acts are our acts, in that they come from our agency in a broad 
sense. Some forms of implicit and explicit bias fall into this category. I  have 
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argued that we should take responsibility for these actions in the situations 
where doing so is necessary for the relevant relationship. So if there is no rela-
tionship at all, taking responsibility is not required. What we should take respon-
sibility for varies with the relationship. In personal relationships, we should take 
responsibility for a wide range of glitches as well as our biases. In our broader 
social relationships, we need to take responsibility for our biases. Taking respon-
sibility is constitutive of respecting in the appropriate way.35
Notes
 1. I am not claiming that all compatibilists would accept this as a characterization of the view. My 
point here is that quality of will is the central feature of a compatibilist account. In fact, many 
compatibilist views depart from a quality of will view, bringing in notions such as history and 
capacity that are not intrinsic qualities of an agent’s will, but extrinsic ones. There is also disa-
greement over what sort of quality of will is relevant, and not just over whether self awareness is 
necessary, but over what levels of reasons responsiveness are needed and how reasons respon-
siveness is understood, and over what sort of identification with one’s own will is required.
 2. See also Michael McKenna’s very clear account of what ‘quality of will’ means (2012, 58– 59), 
though I disagree with McKenna on whether ‘quality’ only refers to moral worth.
 3. See Wallace (1994, 138– 139); Zimmerman (1997 and elsewhere); Rosen (2002 and else-
where); Levy (2011 and elsewhere).
 4. See Watson (1996, 2004) where the term ‘attributionism’ originates. The view is developed 
(in various different ways) by others, including Nomy Arpaly (2003 and elsewhere); Angela 
Smith (2005 and elsewhere); T. M. Scanlon (1998 and elsewhere); Matthew Talbert (2008 
and elsewhere).
 5. See Mason 2015.
 6. I focus on blameworthiness and fault rather than praiseworthiness and achievement because 
in general we are more tolerant of luck in praiseworthiness; we are less reluctant to allow luck 
to play a role in praiseworthy outcomes because less is at stake for the actor.
 7. See Michael Brownstein’s Stanford Encyclopedia article (2016) for a review of the various 
views on that.
 8. See, e.g., Kelly and Roeder 2008; Holroyd 2012; Vargas 2013, esp.  chapter 8.
 9. See Adams (1985) for a very clear justification of that outlook, which of course is the basis of 
the attributionist view.
 10. Indirect responsibility for biases depends on the cultural situation— in a situation where 
there is lots of awareness of bias and good and well- known techniques for countering bias and 
avoiding acquiring bias, it will be much easier to assign blameworthiness for acquiring and 
having biases.
 11. Gary Watson points out this problem (1987; 2004, 247).
 12. Research by Fazio et al. (1995) shows a correlation between implicit racism and sitting fur-
ther away from people of that race. Bessenof and Sherman (2000) demonstrate a similar cor-
relation between bias against fat people and avoidance behavior. These and other results are 
discussed in Dasgupta (2004).
 13. This view is suggested by the psychologist John Bargh (2005). I owe the reference to Holly 
Smith’s discussion (2011, 135). Smith concedes that if there are indeed fully automatic pro-
cesses, then we are not blameworthy for them, and her overall view is that we are blamewor-
thy only if a sufficient proportion of our attitudes are involved in our behavior.
 14. The volitionist has a harder time making sense of blameworthiness for explicit bias, because 
the agent who is genuinely in the grip of false views all the way down, who has never engaged 
in culpable self- deception, cannot be blameworthy on the volitionist view. This is one reason 
the volitionist view seems implausible when proposed as the sole account of responsibility.
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 15. And of course it is possible that we could tell a similar story about other biases, including rac-
ism and homophobia.
 16. Fricker also draws on Anthony Minghella’s screenplay, in which the character of Greenleaf 
says at one point, “Marge, there’s female intuition, and then there are facts” (2007, 1).
 17. I think that epistemic injustice can manifest as both implicit and explicit bias. It appears as 
implicit bias when the agent is not at all aware that she is listening less to, and taking less seri-
ously, members of the oppressed group. It appears as explicit bias when people consciously 
believe things like “women are more intuitive than men and men are more rational then 
women.”
 18. See, e.g., Mills (1998), who argues the point in relation to race.
 19. Fricker claims that to call the agent blameworthy in this sort of case would be hubris (2007, 
105). Instead, she argues for something that we can justifiably do (or feel) in place of blame. 
She suggests that when someone’s circumstances are epistemically limited, although we can-
not aptly feel the resentment of blame, we can aptly feel “resentment of disappointment” 
(104). I return to this below.
 20. Arpaly makes this point too: she gives an example of a young boy raised in an entirely sexist 
and segregated society (2003, 104).
 21. Clarke is interested in responsibility for omissions, but for the sake of my argument here, 
nothing hangs on this being a case of omission. What I call a “glitch” is often called negli-
gence, though that is misleading in various ways. For other examples with this structure, see 
Vargas 2005; King 2009; Sher 2009; Raz 2011; Tannenbaum 2015. See also Mason 2018, 
forthcoming.
 22. Volitionists, of course, argue that the agent is not responsible in these cases, as the control or 
knowledge component is missing, and this case is, from the volitionist perspective, even more 
clearly a case of blamelessness than cases where the control/ knowledge condition is missing 
but the attributionist can point to bad will. Others are more inclined to admit that the case is 
puzzling.
 23. In the passage quoted above, it looks as though Calhoun is assuming a volitionist approach to 
understanding bad will, but we have no reason to assume that she would rule out an attribu-
tionist approach, and the example works well as a case where there is neither the volitionist 
type of bad will nor the attributionist. Calhoun’s main concern is with the nature of the cir-
cumstances, what she calls “an abnormal moral context,” (1989, 390) in which the behavior is 
wrong but widely thought to be permissible.
 24. There is a different sense in which we hold people “responsible” without really believing that 
they are responsible: we assign liability. For example, we hold people responsible for what 
their dogs do. I am not talking about liability, but about responsibility, as will become clear.
 25. Vargas (2013) argues that we should allow forward- looking considerations a more substantial 
role in our responsibility practices than we currently do.
 26. See also Andrea Westlund’s chapter in this volume for a discussion of the difference between 
holding responsible and blaming. The idea that we should take responsibility for things that 
are not under our control is not new. Joseph Raz, in his discussion of negligence (inadvert-
ent fault), argues that we should take responsibility for negligence because our self- respect 
demands it (2010, 17). I discuss Raz’s view in detail, as well as the literature on negligence, in 
Mason (2018, forthcoming). Robert Adams suggests in passing that we should take respon-
sibility for traits that are not under our control (1985, 15). Susan Wolf suggests that there is 
a virtue of taking responsibility (2001, 10); David Enoch (2012) argues that we sometimes 
have a moral duty to take responsibility: I discuss his view below. There may be others that 
I have missed. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 207– 239) talk about taking responsibility, but it is 
clear that they intend for it to be apt only when the agent’s act is under her control. Bernard 
Williams thinks that we are responsible for things that go beyond the boundaries of our wills, 
though he does not talk about taking responsibility (1993, 55– 56).
 27. See, e.g., Shoemaker’s account (2015) of the various ways in which we might be impaired, and 
yet nonetheless have bad will.
 28. It seems obvious that we couldn’t be responsible in my sense for what others freely do (though 
we might be liable), but there is another interesting notion in this neighborhood, that I do not 
go into here, and that is “guilt by association” or “moral taint”— see, e.g., Oshana 2006.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Dec 06 2017, NEWGEN
oso-9780190609610-Hutchison.indd   182 12/6/2017   6:28:21 PM
 Tak ing  R e spon s ib i l i t y  f or  Our   B ia s e s  183
   
 29. See also Shoemaker 2015.
 30. I defend this view in more detail in Mason 2015.
 31. This is not supposed to be a complete account of respect. Obviously I am using an account 
such that respect involves affect. There is another sense of respect such that it is just a matter 
of treating someone appropriately, and in that sense I do think we have a moral duty.
 32. For some different but not unrelated thoughts about feminist approaches to responsibility, 
see Oshana 2016.
 33. A recent study (Extebarria et al. 2009) showing that women feel more guilt than men was 
much discussed on the Internet, and the discussion overwhelmingly has the tone, “tell me 
something I don’t know.”
 34. First put into words by the sociologist Arlie Hochschild (Hochschild and Machung, 1989). 
For another relevant sociological study on gender differences in taking responsibility, see 
Walzer 1996.
 35. Thanks to David Enoch, Alex Guerrero, Jen Morton, Monique Wonderly, and the editors of 
this volume for comments on earlier drafts.
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